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Abstract
Statistical agencies utilize models to synthesize respondent-level data for release to the general
public as an alternative to the actual data records. A Bayesian model synthesizer encodes privacy
protection by employing a hierarchical prior construction that induces smoothing of the real data
distribution. Synthetic respondent-level data records are often preferred to summary data tables due
to the many possible uses by researchers and data analysts. Agencies balance a trade-off between
utility of the synthetic data versus disclosure risks and hold a specific target threshold for disclosure
risk before releasing synthetic datasets. We introduce a pseudo posterior likelihood that exponen-
tiates each contribution by an observation record-indexed weight ∈ (0, 1), defined to be inversely
proportional to the disclosure risk for that record in the synthetic data. Our use of a vector of
weights allows more precise downweighting of high risk records in a fashion that better preserves
utility as compared with using a scalar weight. We illustrate our method with a simulation study
and an application to the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
We demonstrate how the frequentist consistency and uncertainty quantification are affected by the
inverse risk-weighting.
keywords: Bayesian hierarchical models, Data privacy protection, Identification risks, Pseudo
posterior, Synthetic data
1 Introduction
Statistical agencies collect household- or establishment-level data through survey instruments in order
to produce summary statistics. These statistics are often rendered in summary tables defined by
geographic and demographic categories. Researchers and data analysts, additionally, often seek access
to the respondent-level, detailed data records in order to facilitate their research inferential goals; for
example, by conducting regression analysis using variables in the respondent-level dataset. Statistical
agencies in the U.S., such as the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, are under legal
obligation to protect the privacy of survey respondents and prevent the even inadvertent disclosure
of their identities. These agencies increasingly utilize hierarchical Bayesian models, estimated on the
real, record-level data, as “synthesizers” to produce synthetic record-level data (drawn from the model
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posterior predictive distribution) to encode privacy protection by smoothing the real data distribution
(Hu et al., 2018). Dimitrakakis et al. (2017) demonstrate a direct link between prior smoothing and
privacy protection, which contrasts with the usual approach of adding randomly-generated noise to the
data (Dwork et al., 2006) in non-modeling contexts.
The degree of privacy protection encoded by synthetic data may be quantified for each record by
computing an identification disclosure risk for that record and for the overall file. The identification
disclosure risk is constructed relative to the knowledge held by a putative intruder and assumptions
about her possible actions; for example, it is common to synthesize some variables (such as income)
conditioned on known, un-synthesized variables where the publishing of these variables presents little
disclosure risk. The intersections among levels of known (and un-synthesized) categorical variables, such
as age, gender, and education level categories, form a collection of patterns (Hu and Savitsky, 2018).
The intruder will seek the identify of a target record by examining the distribution of records in the
pattern containing that record. We assume that the intruder knows the true value(s) of the synthesized
variable(s) for the record whose identity they seek. The identification disclosure risk may be constructed
as a probability formed as 1 minus the number of records in a pattern whose synthesized variable(s)
values lie inside some  radius of the true value (for a continuous variable); that is, the probability that
synthesized records lie outside the ball of radius  around the true record value of interest. Records
whose values of the synthesized variable lie within the  radius are deemed “close”. If there are relatively
few records close to the true target record value, then that target record is unique, sparsely covered
and easier for an intruder to discover the identity (Quick et al., 2015).
A mixture synthesizer is able to data-adaptively shrink the real data distribution to promote a high
utility for the synthetic data user; for example, the data analyst will achieve a relatively high utility
if the coefficients of a regression model that she estimates on the synthetic data are close the values
that would be estimated on the real data. In general, a high utility for synthetic data is achieved
when its distribution is similar to the real data distribution (Hu and Savitsky, 2018). Yet, there are
some portions of the real data distribution that present a higher disclosure risk than other portions.
For any synthesized variable, such as income, records in relatively sparsely populated portions of the
distribution, such as the tails, may express high risks for disclosure to the extent that the synthesizer
generates values close to the true value. Focusing on a high risk record in the tail, a flexible, mixture
synthesizer may produce synthetic data that express too much risk by not adequately shrinking the tail
portions towards the high mass regions of the distribution.
We introduce a collection of weights, α = (α1 ∈ (0, 1), . . . , αn ∈ (0, 1)) that are indexed by each of n
observations to exponentiate the likelihood contributions in a pseudo likelihood framework that, when
convolved with the prior distributions, produce a joint pseudo posterior distribution. (See Savitsky
and Toth (2016) for background on a pseudo posterior distribution constructed in the case of complex
survey sampling). Each αi(y) (where y = (y1, . . . , yn) are the observed response values) is constructed
as 1 minus the probability of identification disclosure for record i multiplies with a record-specific
constant, such that the likelihood contribution for a high risk record is effectively downweighted, which
strengthens the influence of the prior distribution (and lower-risk observations) for that record. This
straightforward approach may be viewed as setting an anti-informative prior for high risk observations
that induces the synthesizer to surgically distort the high risk portions of the data distribution in a
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fashion that preserves the high mass portions. In essence, our pseudo posterior is designed to induce
misspecification that targets only the high risk portion of the distribution. We expect this vector
weights approach to express higher utility for the same risk level as would be the case under use of a
scalar weight that introduces a global tempering (Bhattacharya et al., 2019).
Unlike the set-up of Miller and Dunson (2018), our use of weighting to induce misspecification of
the actual data distribution is purposeful in order to encode privacy protection. So we don’t view the
observed data as a corrupted version of the true data generated by some model, Pθ0 , but rather our
approach inserts corruption into the synthetic data (in a local, by-record way that we hope is efficient
in terms of preservation of utility). In the former case where the observed data are viewed as corrupted,
a scalar weight ∈ (0, 1) is used to induce tempering in the posterior distribution to express robustness
by smoothing over the corruption. Since our purpose is to induce the minimal misspecification in the
synthetic data needed to achieve a privacy protection threshold, while at the same time preserving a
high utility for the synthetic data, it is more natural to use a vector of weights to mitigate the risk-utility
trade-off. We extend the theoretical result of Bhattacharya et al. (2019) on the frequentist consistency
of the misspecified estimator (at a value θ∗ ∈ Θ, not including the true generating parameter, θ0) in
the sequel, where we demonstrate that the contraction rate is injured by the degree of misspecification
induced by α. Our specification of a vector of weights, α, depends on the observed data, y, and also
on draws of synthetic data from the model posterior predictive distribution, unlike the specification of
the scalar α in the consistency result of Bhattacharya et al. (2019) and the implementation of Miller
and Dunson (2018). As we will discuss in the sequel, we implement our Bayesian pseudo posterior in
a manner that fixes the vector α (with respect to the prior distribution on θ ∈ Θ) because the real
data, y, are held private by the statistical agency, such that for our purposes these data are exact and
modeling is used to induce misspecification into the publicly-released synthetic data. So α(y) are also
exact and should not be smoothed in our synthesizer.
We illustrate the performance of our approach in a simulation study, and by utilizing respondent-
level data for the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CE), published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). The CE publishes summary, domain-level statistics used for both policy-making and research,
including the most widely used measure of inflation - the Consumer Price Index (CPI), measures of
poverty that determine thresholds for the U.S. Federal Supplemental Poverty Measure. The CE consists
of two surveys: i) the Quarterly Interview Survey, which aims to capture large purchases (such as rent,
utilities, and vehicles), contains approximately 7,000 interviews, and is conducted every quarter; and
ii) the Diary Survey, administered on an annual basis, focuses on capturing small purchases (such as
food, beverages, tobacco), contains approximately 14,000 interviews of households. We focus on the CE
public-use microdata (PUMD) that result from these instruments. Unlike published CE tables, which
release information from the CE data in aggregated forms, the CE PUMD releases the CE data at the
individual, respondent level, which potentially enables the CE data users to conduct research tailored
to their interests. Directly releasing individual-level data, however, poses privacy concerns.
Section 1.1 introduces details of the CE sample data in the application and CE survey program’s
current top-coding practice of the family income variable in the CE PUMD for disclosure control. It
also discusses the motivation of the development of our risk-weighted pseudo posterior method.
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1.1 The CE data and the top-coded family income
The CE data sample in our application comes from the 2017 1st quarter Interview Survey. There are n =
6,208 consumer units (CU) in this sample. A CU defines a collection of related people, such as a family,
who are financially independent of other collections of people who may reside in the same physical
location or household; e.g., roommates. Generally, however, the CU used by CE may be thought of
as a household. We focus on 11 variables: gender, age, education level, region, urban, marital status,
urban type, CBSA, family size, earner, and family income. The first 10 variables are either categorical in
nature or discretized from continuous. They are considered insensitive, therefore not to be synthesized
and used as predictors. The family income variable is continuous, ranging from approximately -7K
to 1,800K (rounded for confidentiality; negative family income values reflect investment and business
loses). This variable is considered sensitive, therefore to be synthesized for disclosure protection. See
Table 1 for details of the variables.
The sensitive family income variable is highly right-skewed, as shown by its density plot in Figure
1. The 97.5 percentile value for this variable is approximately $270K.
Variable Description
Gender Gender of the reference person; 2 categories
Age Age of the reference person; 5 categories
Education Level Education level of the reference person; 8 categories
Region Region of the CU; 4 categories
Urban Urban status of the CU; 2 categories
Marital Status Marital status of the reference person; 5 categories
Urban Type Urban area type of the CU; 3 categories
CBSA 2010 core-based statistical area (CBSA) status; 3 categories
Family Size Size of the CU; 11 categories
Earner Earner status of the reference person; 2 categories
Family Income Imputed and reported income before tax of the CU;
approximate range: (-7K, 1,800K)
Table 1: Variables used in the CE sample. Data taken from the 2017 Q1 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Currently, the CE PUMD releases a top-coded version of the family income values to the public.
In statistical disclosure control (SDC) literature, top-coding refers to the practice of using a pre-chosen
value and censoring any values above the pre-chosen top-coded value to that value (An and Little, 2007).
While the application of top-coding techniques induces disclosure protection by not releasing the exact
value of a CU’s family income for a certain portion of the distribution (especially for the extreme values),
top-coding might negatively impact the utility of the microdata by destroying important features of the
distribution, especially in the tails. As evident in Figure 2 and Figure 3, the density plots of the top-
coded family income (green) deviate from the those of the real family income (red) in the approximately
top 97.5% portion of the distribution. These will without a doubt worsen any inferences related to the
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right tail of the distribution of family income, when top-coded microdata is used by data analysts in
place of the confidential real microdata. There is also an implicit assumption in top-coding that high
risk records are concentrated in the right tail of the income distribution, which we show in the sequel
to be false.
There is, therefore, an opportunity to propose alternatives to top-coding for release of highly skewed
continuous data. An and Little (2007) demonstrate through simulation studies and real data application
that synthetic record-level data provides better inferences than top-coding. The synthetic data approach
employs straightforward estimation, while offering good statistical disclosure control properties. In this
paper, we take the synthetic data approach to the CE data sample and aim at generating partially
synthetic CE data where the sensitive CU’s family income variable is synthesized. To evaluate the degree
of privacy protection encoded by synthetic data, we propose measures that quantify the identification
disclosure risks as record-level probabilities ∈ (0, 1) of disclosure. We end up with a collection of
record-level identification disclosure risks for all records.
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Figure 1: Density plot of Family Income.
We start with a synthesizer that well-reproduces the real data distribution with high utility. For
any record with unacceptably high disclosure risk, instead of developing new synthesizers to generate
a new set of synthetic values for inducing higher disclosure protection, we introduce a record-level
weight which is inversely proportional to its disclosure risk. The weight is then used to exponentiate
the record’s likelihood contribution in a pseudo likelihood framework, effectively downweighting its
likelihood contribution to partially defeat the likelihood principle and induce targeted misspecification,
and a new synthetic value is generated for the record from a weighted version of the original synthesizer.
We propose to surgically distort the high risk portions in the data distribution after synthetic data
generation. Our methods provide statistical agencies the flexibility to target high risk records for
added smoothing by the prior when producing synthetic microdata for public release.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a mixture synthesizer that we
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will use for the CE data sample. In Section 3, we provide a general specification for the α− weighted
pseudo posterior distribution that includes our approach for constructing (α1, . . . , αn) based on the
measured identification disclosure risk for each of the n records. Section 4 constructs conditions that
guarantee the frequentist consistency of our α− weighted synthesizer and reveals how the contraction
rate is impacted by α. We further demonstrate the distortion induced into the asymptotic covariance
matrix of the pseudo MLE and pseudo posterior by α. Section 5 implements a simulation study to
demonstrate how the α− pseudo posterior produces synthetic data that distorts the portion of the
observed data distribution expressing high risk of identification disclosure. We apply our methods to
the CE data sample for generating synthetic family income in Section 6. The paper concludes with
discussion in Section 7.
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Figure 2: Density plots of the original and top-
coded family income: range (250K, 500K).
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Figure 3: Density plots of the original and top-
coded family income: range (500K, 3,000K).
2 Finite Mixture Synthesizer
Synthesizers are statistical models applied to the confidential data; however, it is important to highlight
that in the eyes of statistical agencies, the confidential data held private to them are the truth and cannot
be released to the public due to privacy concerns. Therefore, synthesizers are not utilized to extract
noise in the confidential data to uncover a latent truth, which is the usual set-up for modeling. Instead,
synthesizing models (which we label, “synthesizers”) induce prior smoothing into the confidential, true
data distribution (where the true data are only visible to the statistical agency) by simulating synthetic
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data with draws from the posterior predictive distribution. The smoothing of the real distribution
induced by the synthesizer encodes privacy protection for the synthetic data that are released to the
public.
For the CE data sample introduced in Section 1.1, our goal is to generate partially synthetic data.
Among the 11 variables, only the family income variable is sensitive and synthesized. It is continu-
ous and highly skewed. The other 10 variables are insensitive, therefore un-synthesized and used as
predictors in synthesizing family income.
Our proposed synthesizer is a flexible, parametric finite mixture synthesizer for a sensitive continuous
variable, utilizing a number of available predictors. We now describe the synthesizer in the context
of the CE data sample; however, we believe this synthesizer is generalizable and widely applicable for
synthesizing skewed continuous data.
Let yi be the logarithm of the family income for CU i, and xi be the R × 1 vector including an
intercept and the values of predictors of CU i. There are n CUs in the sample.
yi | Xi, zi, β, σ ∼ Normal(yi | x′iβ∗zi , (σ∗zi)2) (1)
zi | pi ∼ Multinomial(1;pi1, · · · , piK) (2)
Our finite mixture construction over-specifies the number the number of mixture components, K,
to facilitate the flexible clustering of CUs that employ the same generating distribution component for
y. Under our modeling setup, we sample locations, (β∗k, (σ
∗
k)
2) and cluster indicators, zi ∈ (1, . . . ,K),
for CU i. The cluster indicators, (zi) are generated from Multinomial draws with cluster probabilities,
(pi1, · · · , piK) in Equation (2).
We induce sparsity in the number in the number of clusters developed through our sampling of the
(pik) with,
(pi1, . . . , piK) ∼ Dirichlet
( γ
K
, . . . ,
γ
K
)
(3)
γ ∼ Gamma(aγ , bγ). (4)
Although parametric, under this prior construction for (pi, γ), our model becomes arbitrarily close to
a Dirichlet process mixture for an unknown measure, F , specified with generating model parameters,
(βi, σ
2
i ) ∼ F in the limit of K ↑ ∞ (Neal, 2000). Our parametric formulation denotes a truncated
Dirichlet process (TDP). The γ hyperparameter induces sparsity in the number of non-zero cluster
probabilities in Equation (3). Due to its influence on the number of clusters learned by the data, we
place a further Gamma prior on γ.
We specify multivariate Normal priors for each regression coefficient vector of coefficient locations,
β∗k as in Equation (5), and t priors for each standard deviation σ
∗
k as in Equation (6).
β∗k
iid∼ MVNR(0,diag(σβ)×
R×R
Ωβ ×diag(σβ)) (5)
σ∗k
iid∼ t(3, 0, 1), (6)
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where the R × R correlation matrix, Ωβ, receives a uniform prior over the space of R × R correlation
matrices (Stan Development Team, 2016) and each component of σβ receives a Student-t prior with 3
degrees of freedom.
To generate synthetic family income of each CU, we first generate sample values of (pi(l), β∗,(l), σ∗,(l))
from the posterior distribution at MCMC iteration l. We estimate our TDP mixture model using Stan
(Stan Development Team, 2016), after marginalizing out the discrete cluster assignment probabilities,
z. So we generate cluster assignments, a posteriori, from the full conditional distributions given, pi(l),
with,
(zi | (pik), (yi), (β∗k, σ∗k)) = Multinomial
(
1;
[
pi1φ(yi | x′iβ∗1, σ∗1)
]
, . . . ,
[
piKφ(yi | x′iβ∗K , σ∗K)
])
, (7)
where φ(·) denotes the density function of a Normal distribution. We next generate synthetic family
income, {y(l)i , i = 1, · · · , n}, through a Normal draw given predictor vectors {xi, i = 1, · · · , n}, and
samples of z(l), β∗,(l) and σ∗,(l), as in Equation (1). Let Z(l) denote a partially synthetic dataset at
MCMC iteration l. We repeat the process for m times, creating m independent partially synthetic
datasets Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)).
3 Risk-weighted Pseudo Posterior
When releasing partially synthetic data to the public, where sensitive variables are synthesized and
insensitive variables are un-synthesized, there are two types of disclosure risks associated with the
release: i) attribute disclosure risks, and ii) identification disclosure risks (Hu, 2019).
We use our CE data sample application as a working example to explain and illustrate these concepts
of risk. With family income synthesized, although an intruder can no longer know the true value of
the synthesized family income of any CU, she can make guesses about the true value, a disclosure
commonly known as attribute disclosure. Moreover, if the intruder possess knowledge of a pattern of
un-synthesized categorical variables (e.g. {gender, age, education level}, or any other subsets of the 10
un-synthesized categorical variables) and the true value of the synthesized family income of a CU, she
could make guesses about the identity of the CU, a disclosure commonly referred to as identification
disclosure.
With CE program’s emphasis on identification disclosure in the CE PUMD release due to legal
prohibitions on record re-identification, we focus on identification disclosure and develop a record-level
probability of identification disclosure risk measure for each CU. We proceed to construct record-level
measures for identification disclosure risks in Section 3.1. Based on these measures, we construct the
record-level weights for the pseudo likelihood framework in Section 3.2, which leads to our proposed
risk-weighted pseudo posterior.
3.1 Probability of Identification Disclosure
The released m synthetic datasets, Z = (Z(1), · · · ,Z(m)), are publicly available. Suppose the intruder
seeks identities of records within each synthetic dataset, Z(l). In addition to Z(l), assume the intruder
has access to an external file, which contains the following information on each CU, i: i) a known
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pattern of the un-synthesized categorical variables, Xpi ⊆ Xi, ii) the true value of synthesized family
income yi, and iii) a name or identity of interest. With access to such external information, the intruder
may attempt to determine the identity of the CU for record i by first performing matches based on
the known pattern Xpi . Let M
(l)
p,i be the collection of CUs sharing the pattern, p, with CU i. Let
the cardinality, |M (l)p,i |, denote the number of CUs in M (l)p,i . Note that the intruder will base their
interrogation of the records in M
(l)
p,i on the synthesized family income for those records, not their real
data values.
Armed with the knowledge of the true value of family income yi of CU i, the intruder will seek those
records whose synthetic values, y∗,(l), are “close” to the true data value, yi (where we next more formally
define “close” as within a specified ball around the truth). If there are few records with synthetic values
y∗,(l) close to yi, the identification disclosure risk may be higher if the true record is among those records
that are close to y∗,(l). In this case where there are few synthetic data values covering the true value for
CU record i, the intruder may randomly select a record (since each is otherwise identical in pattern and
close to the truth) from only a few records, elevating their probability of correctly identifying record, i.
Define B(yp,i, r) as a ball of radius r around true value, yp,i, where p denotes the pattern containing
the truth for record i in which the intruder will concentrate her search. Let indicator, T
(l)
p,i = 1, if the
synthetic data value for record, i, y
∗,(l)
p,i is among those records, j ∈ M (l)p,i whose y∗,(l)p,j ∈ B(yp,i, r); that
is, T
(l)
p,i = 1 if the synthesized value for record i is close (within a ball of radius, r) to the true value,
yp,i. We define the probability of identification for record, i, as:
IR
(l)
i := Pr
(l) (identification disclosure of i) =
∑
j∈M(l)p,i
I
(
y
∗,(l)
p,j /∈ B(yi, r)
)
|M (l)p,i |
× T (l)p,i , (8)
where I(·) is the indicator function. This identification disclosure risk is constructed as the probability
that the synthetic values for records in the focus pattern, p, are not close to the truth. This means
that there are relatively few records in the pattern close (within a ball of radius r) to, or covering, the
truth, such that the intruder has a higher probability of guessing the record of the name they seek.
The attribute risk, by contrast, is higher if there are more records with synthetic values, y∗,(l), close to
the truth because then the intruder has a higher probability of selecting a value near the true attribute
through guessing. So the identification disclosure risk, IR
(l)
i , is inversely proportional to the attribute
disclosure risk in the sense that if there are many records whose synthetic values are similar to the
truth, then the intruder has more difficulty to find the correct record that matches the identity they
seek.
It may be the case, however, that though there are only a few records with y
∗,(l)
p,j close to the
truth, yp,i, the true record may not be among those records, such that T
(l)
p,i = 0, which means that the
intruder has a 0 probability of finding the record for the name they seek. The event of T
(l)
p,i = 0 may
occur because the synthesizer “mixes” values while well-preserving the true data distribution. We see
an example of this in our CE application in the sequel.
The choice of r connotes a notion of close that we use to identify (the synthetic data value for)
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a record as isolated using the complement of close. The value for r is set by the statistical agency
as a matter of policy. A more conservative agency will select a relatively smaller value for r, which
produces a higher probability that a record is isolated and, hence, produces a higher identification risk
to the extent that the indicator, Ti = 1, to denote that the synthetic data value, y
∗
i , for target record,
i, is within radius r of the true datum value, yi. As the radius shrinks each record become relatively
more isolated, though Ti is more likely to flip from 1 to 0. This flipping phenomenon will be more
pronounced in relatively well-mixing synthesizers. In practice, r is set through specifying a percentage
of the (yp,i) (e.g., we utilize 20% in our application to follow) in order to allow the magnitude of the
radius of closeness to adapt to the magnitude of the data value. Statistical agencies find the setting of
r in this way to be more intuitive.
We take the average of IR
(l)
i across m synthetic datasets and use IRi =
∑m
l=1 IR
(l)
i as the final
record-level identification disclosure risk for CU i. These IRi’s are used to determine the level of
privacy protection to encode in the synthetic datasets Z, for each CU, individually. The IRi’s are
used to construct record-level weights, αi’s, which are inversely proportional to IRi’s. These weights
exponentiate the CU’s likelihood contribution in a pseudo likelihood framework. For CU i, the higher
the IRi, the lower the weight αi, translating to a smaller likelihood contribution of CU i in the pseudo
likelihood. In this way, we downweight the likelihood contributions of relatively higher risk records. We,
then generate new synthetic datasets, ZV , from this weighted version of the original synthesizer. This
procedure surgically distorts the high risk portions in the data distribution to produce new synthetic
datasets with higher disclosure protection.
We proceed to construct the record-level weights, (α1, · · · , αn), from the record-level identification
disclosure risk measures, (IR1, · · · , IRn), and the pseudo posterior framework for synthetic data with
the goal to induce higher disclosure protection at a minimal loss of utility.
3.2 Pseudo Posterior
When the identification disclosure risk IRi of CU i is relatively high, the likelihood contribution of CU
i will be downweighted, which, in turn strengthens, the influence of the prior distribution for CU i.
Therefore, the record-level weights (α1, . . . , αn) should be inversely proportional to the identification
disclosure risks, (IR1, . . . , IRn). We propose the following formulation, which guarantees the weights
∈ (0, 1):
αi = min(0, 1− ci × IRi), (9)
where IRi is the identification disclosure risk of CU i, and ci is a record-level constant to control the
amount of augmentation or deflation of IRi to determine the likelihood contribution of CU i. We use
a sigmoid curve for ci, making the value of ci dependent on the value of IRi, so that we augment the
identification disclosure risk to a greater extent for relatively high risk values. We downweight more of
the likelihood contribution of CU i if its IRi is relatively high. We set the range of ci to be bounded
below by cmin = 1 and bounded above by cmax = 1.5, and bound αi below by 0, as in Equation (9).
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We formulate the following risk-adjusted pseudo-posterior distribution to induce misspecification
into our re-estimated synthesizer,
pα ((pik,β
∗
k, σ
∗
k)k=1,...,K | y, θ) ∝
[
n∏
i=1
p
(
yi | (pik,β∗k, σ∗k)Kk=1
)αi] K∏
k=1
p (pik,β
∗
k, σ
∗
k | θ) , (10)
where αi ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
Our use of weight αi applied to the likelihood of observation yi can be seen as an anti-informative
prior, as in 1/
(
p
(
yi | (pik,β∗k, σ∗k)Kk=1
))1−αi applied to the full likelihood for CU record, i. The weights,
α, are purposefully designed to partially defeat the likelihood principle to induce misspecification,
targeting only the high risk portion of the distribution. Furthermore, the weights are dependent on
the real data, y, which the statistical agency holds private and considers known. We, therefore, do not
model the weights α with the data y in order to smooth the weights since the risks on which these
weights are computed are viewed as exact. It also bears mention that the α are utilized to selectively
downweight likelihood contributions to induce further misspecification into our synthesizer, so that
further smoothing of α under a model would undo our intent. Therefore, we use the weights as plug-in
to surgically distort high risk portion of the distribution.
4 Consistency and Asymptotic Covariance of the Risk-weighted Pseudo
Posterior
In this section we demonstrate the frequentist consistency properties of our risk-adjusted, weighted
pseudo posterior estimator, θ, to a point, θ∗ ∈ Θ, in a space that may not contain the true data
generating model, θ0, due to our intentional inducing of misspecification in our synthesizer to reduce
the probability of identification disclosure. We show that the rate of contraction is injured by αm :=
maxi=1,...,n αi in the set of downweighted records (where we recall that αi ∈ (0, 1) denotes the risk-
adjusted pseudo likelihood weight for data record, i). Our first result extends that of Bhattacharya
et al. (2019) for misspecified models from a scalar weight, α, to our set-up of a vector of record-indexed
weights. We show that the utilization of vector-weighting achieves consistency if the downweighting
of record likelihood contributions grows progressively more sparse. We utilize this consistency result
and proceed to show that the asymptotic covariance matrix for the pseudo MLE is different from the
regular MLE due to scale and shape distortions induced by the (αi). We further show that the pseudo
MLE sandwich form the asymptotic covariance matrix is different than the inverse Fisher information
form for the pseudo posterior distribution, due to the failure of Bartlett’s second identity (because the
pseudo likelihood is approximate). The implication is that uncertainty quantification of the credibility
intervals of the synthesizer will be incorrect, both because they are centered on θ∗, rather than θ0, and
because of the different forms for the asymptotic covariance matrices. Our second result specializes
that of Kleijn and van der Vaart (2012) to our pseudo posterior construction.
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4.1 Preliminaries
We address the case of n independent observations for X(n) = X1, . . . , Xn, where Xi
ind∼ Pθ0,i and we
perform inference on Pθ,i. Pθ,i admits a density, pθ,i with respect to dominating measure, µi, on the
space, (Xi,Ai), where Ai is a σ field of sets. We construct the measure, P (n)θ = ⊗nı=1Pθ,i, dominated by
µ = ⊗nı=1µi on a product of measurable spaces, ⊗nı=1 (Xi,Ai). In the sequel, we write Pθ and Eθ (rather
than P
(n)
θ and E
(n)
θ ), though the dependence on n is implied.
We formulate our risk-weighted pseudo likelihood in a fashion to generalize Bhattacharya et al.
(2019) as,
Ln,α (θ) =
n∏
i=1
{pθ,i(Xi)}αi(X
(n)) , (11)
where we allow αi to be dependent on X
(n), since it is constructed based on the disclosure probability
for record, i. We account for the dependence of αi on X
(n) in assessing the frequentist properties
of our Bayesian estimator since under frequentist consistency, the X(n) are random with respect to
P
(n)
θ (for fixed θ), so taking probabilities and expectations with respect to P
(n)
θ requires to address
the dependence of αi on X
(n) to construct the contraction rate for correctness and thoroughness. We
note for contrast that our Bayesian implementation for our pseudo posterior synthesizer uses (αi) as a
plug-in because the (αi) are dependent on real data, X
(n), and the real data are treated exact by the
statistical agency (and the purpose of the synthesizer is to induce misspecification into publicly-released
data). We suppress the X(n) in the sequel for readability.
We formulate the posterior distribution, Πn,α, by convolving the pseudo likelihood, Ln,α, with the
prior distribution, Πn, such that for any measurable set, B,
Πn,α
(
B|X(n)
)
=
∫
θ∈B Ln,α (θ) Πn (dθ)∫
θ∈Θ Ln,α (θ) Πn (dθ)
=
∫
θ∈B e
−rn,α(θ,θ∗)Πn (dθ)∫
θ∈Θ e
−rn,α(θ,θ∗)Πn (dθ)
, (12)
where rn,α (θ, θ
∗) :=
∑n
i=1 αi log {pθ∗(Xi)/pθ(Xi)}, which is a generalization of the definition from
Bhattacharya et al. (2019) to incorporate risk-adjusted weights, (αi).
Since our pseudo posterior formulation induces misspecification, we allow the true generating pa-
rameters, θ0, to lie outside the parameter space, Θ. Let D(p, q) =
∫
p log(p/q)dµ denote the Kullback-
Liebler (KL) divergence. We show in the sequel that our model contracts on θ∗ ∈ Θ in Pθ0− probability,
where θ∗ is the point that minimizes the KL divergence from Pθ0 ; that is,
θ∗ := arg min
θ∈Θ
D
(
p
(n)
θ , p
(n)
θ0
)
. (13)
We show consistency under an extension of the α− Re´nyi divergence measure to a product measure
space,
D
(n)
θ0,α
(θ, θ∗) =
n∑
i=1
Dθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗) =
n∑
i=1
1
αi − 1 log {Aθ0,α (θ, θ
∗)} , (14)
where
Aθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗) =
∫ (
pθ,i
pθ∗,i
)αi
pθ0,idµi (15)
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is defined as the α− affinity for observation, Xi, such that A(n)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) =
∏n
i=1Aθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗), the α−
affinity for the product measure space. We note that Bhattacharya et al. (2019) show Dθ0,α,i (θ, θ
∗) ≥ 0
and Dθ0,α,i (θ
∗, θ∗) = 0. These properties extend to the composition, D(n)θ0,α (θ, θ
∗) on the product
measure space.
We next construct an α− weighted empirical distribution,
Pn,α =
1
n
n∑
i=1
αiδ (Xi) , (16)
where δ(Xi) denotes the Dirac delta function with probability mass 1 at Xi. We construct the as-
sociated scaled and centered empirical process, Gn,α =
√
n (Pn,α − Pθ0). The usual equally-weighted
empirical distribution, Pn = 1n
∑n
i=1 δ (Xi) and associated, Gn =
√
n (Pn − Pθ0) may be viewed as
special cases. We may define the associated expectation functionals with respect to the α− weighted
empirical distribution by Pn,αf = 1n
∑n
i=1 αif (Xi).
We construct the asymptotic covariance matrix for the following centered and scaled empirical
process under our misspecified estimator,
hn =
√
n (θ − θ∗) , (17)
from which we define, hˆn =
√
n
(
θˆn,α − θ∗
)
, where θˆn,α denotes the α− pseudo MLE.
We next introduce two variance expressions that we utilize to construct the asymptotic covariance
matrix of the pseudo MLE under our employment of intentional misspecification,
Hθ0,θ∗,α = −EPθ0
[
Pn,α ¨`θ∗
]
(18)
= −EPθ0
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
αi ¨`θ∗ (Xi)
]
(19)
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
EPθ0αi
¨`
θ∗ (Xi) , (20)
which is a risk-adjustment weighted version of the Fisher information. The second weighted variance
expression we define is,
Jθ0,θ∗,α = VarPθ0
[
Pn,α ˙`θ∗
]
(21)
=
1
n2
EPθ0
{
n∑
i=1
αi ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
}2
, (22)
which is the variance of the weighted score function and the middle term in sandwich estimator for the
asymptotic covariance matrix of the pseudo MLE. Let Hθ0,θ∗ and Jθ0,θ∗ be unweighted versions of the
above expressions (replacing αi with 1).
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4.2 Main Result
The following conditions guarantee the consistency result in Theorem 1 and the forms for asymptotic
covariance matrices of the distributions for pseudo MLE and the pseudo posterior in the following
theorems. Theorem 2 extends Theorem 5.23 of van der Vaart (1998) to derive the asymptotic expansion
of our form for a centered and scaled α− pseudo MLE. Theorem 3 specializes a result in Kleijn and
van der Vaart (2012) on the sandwich form of the covariance matrix for the pseudo MLE to our α−
pseudo MLE. These conditions also allow use of Kleijn and van der Vaart (2012) and van der Vaart
(1998) to specify the form of asymptotic covariance matrix for the pseudo posterior distribution in
Theorem 4. We demonstrate that the asymptotic covariance matrices are different for each of the
MLE, the pseudo-MLE and the pseudo-posterior.
(A1) ((Prior mass covering truth) We construct a KL neighborhood of θ∗ with radius, ξ,with,
Bn (θ
∗, ξ; θ0) =
{
θ ∈ Θ :
n∑
i=1
∫
pθ0,i log (pθ∗,i/pθ,i) dµi ≤ nξ2,
n∑
i=1
∫
pθ0,i log
2 (pθ∗,i/pθ,i) dµi ≤ nξ2
}
(23)
Restrict the prior, Πn, to place positive probability on this KL neighborhood,
Πn (Bn (θ
∗, ξ; θ0)) ≥ e−nξ2n . (24)
(A2) (Control size of α) Let An :=
{
i : αi < 1
−; i ∈ 1, . . . , n} and nA := |An|, where |An| denotes the
number of elements in An. Let Qn :=
{
i : αi = α
(n) ≥ 1−; i ∈ 1, . . . , n
}
and nQ := |Qn|.
lim sup
n
|An| = lim sup
n
nA = O
(
n
1
2
)
, with Pθ0−probability 1
lim sup
n
(1− α(n)) = O
(
n
− 1
2
Q
)
, with Pθ0−probability 1,
such that for constants C1, C3 > 0 and n sufficiently large,
sup
n
|An| ≤ C1n 12
sup
n
(1− α(n)) ≤ C3ξnn−
1
2
Q
(A3) (Continuity) For each θ ∈ Θ ∈ Rd (an open subset of Euclidean space), `θ0
(
X(n)
)
be a measurable
function (of X(n)) and differentiable at θ0 for Pθ0− almost every X(n) ∈ X (with derivative,
˙`
θ0
(
X(n)
)
), such that for every θ1 and θ2 in a neighborhood of θ0 with Eθ ˙`θ0
(
X(n)
)
˙`
θ0
(
X(n)
)T
<
∞, we have a Lipschitz condition:∣∣∣`θ1 (X(n))− `θ2 (X(n)) ∣∣∣ ≤ ˙`θ∗ (X(n)) ‖θ1 − θ2‖a.s. Pθ0
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(A4) (Local Quadratic Expansion) The Kullback-Liebler divergence with respect to Pθ0 has a second
order Taylor expansion about θ∗,
EPθ0 log
pθ
pθ∗
=
1
2
(θ − θ∗)T Hθ0,θ∗,α (θ − θ∗) + O
(
‖θ − θ∗‖2
)
,
where Hθ0 is a d× d positive definite matrix.
(A5) (Bartlett’s First Identity)
EPθ0
˙`
θ∗ = 0
The first two conditions are required for consistency of our α− pseudo posterior estimator. The first
condition requires the prior to place some mass on a KL ball near θ∗ as defined in Equation (13).
The second condition outlines a dyadic subgrouping of data records, where An contains those records
whose likelihood contributions are downweighted to lessen the estimated identification disclosure risk
for those records in the resulting synthetic data. The second subset of records, Qn, contains those
records that are minimally downweighted due to nearly zero values for identification disclosure risks.
Since αi < 1, ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n), the constant value, α(n), for all units in Qn approaches 1 from the
left. We show in the sequel that the consistency result to θ∗ for the synthesizer is dominated by the
likelihood weighting for records in the downweighted set, An. We set each αi(X
(n)) on the set An based
on the actual data value for observed record, i, Xi, and the synthetic data X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
n ∼ pM (X∗|X(n)),
with implicit conditioning on the model, M , after integrating out θ from the synthesizer. So the
(αi) ∈ An may be expected to express mutual dependence in the general case for assessing frequentist
consistency, unlike the (Xi), which are assumed to be independent. While our consistency result allows
for dependence among the (αi) ∈ An, condition (A2) restricts the number of downweighted records
(where αi < 1
−) to grow at a slower rate than the sample size, n, such that the downweighting
becomes relatively more sparse. This restriction accords well with the assignment of a relatively high
identification risk score to records in only small portions of the distribution mass, such as the tail.
We next list our results for consistency of the α− pseudo posterior distribution and an associated
Bernstein von Mises result for the α− pseudo MLE. We use this result to enumerate the form of the
associated asymptotic covariance matrix for the pseudo MLE, followed by that for the pseudo posterior.
All proofs are contained in a Supplement that accompanies this manuscript, except where otherwise
noted.
Theorem 1 (Contraction of the α− pseudo posterior distribution).
Let α(X(n)) = (α1(X1) ∈ (0, 1), . . . , αn(Xn) ∈ (0, 1)). Define αm := max
i∈An
αi ∈ (0, 1) and αl := min
i∈An
αi ∈
(0, 1). Let D
(nA)
θ0,α
(θ, θ∗) =
∑
i∈An Dθ0,α,i and D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗) =
∑
i∈Qn Dθ0,1−,i. Let θ
∗ be as defined in
Equation (13). Assume that ξn satisfies nξ
2
n ≥ 2 and suppose conditions (A1) and condition (A2)
hold. Let C∗1 =
√
2 + C21 + C
2
3 ≥
√
2. Then for any D ≥ 2 and t > 0,
Πn,α
(
1
n
[
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)ξ2n
∣∣X(n)) ≤ e−tnξ2n , (25)
hold with Pθ0− probability at least 1−
[
(α2l + 2)(C
∗
1 )
2/α2m × 2/
{
(D + t− 1)2nξ2n
}]
.
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Since (1 − α(n)) = O(n−1/2Q ), while nA = O(n1/2), the first term on the left-hand size of Equation 25
dominates with increasing n, so that the (1 − αm)−1 is the dominating penalty on the ξn contraction
rate of the α− pseudo posterior. Even though the downweighting becomes relatively more sparse due
to condition (A2), it is the maximum value of αi for i ∈ An on the set of downweighted records that
penalizes the rate. Since αi ≤ 1−, ∀i ∈ An, our result generalizes Bhattacharya et al. (2019) to
allow a tempering of a portion of the posterior distribution and there is a penalty to be paid in terms
of contraction rate for the tempering. The rate in Pθ0− probability is further injured by a factor,
(2 + α2l )/α
2
m × (C∗1 )2, where C∗1 ≥ 2, relative to Bhattacharya et al. (2019). This additional penalty
arises because vector-weighting shifts posterior mass from high to low risk regions of the data support,
which induces a distribution contraction. Since we induce the misspecification through the weights, α,
the distance of the point of contraction, θ∗ from the true generating parameters, θ0, and the contraction
rate on this point are both impacted by the induced misspecification. The requirement for increasing
sparsity in the number of downweighted record likelihood contributions, however, ensures that θ∗ will
be relatively close to θ0, which ensures the utility of our estimator.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic normality of the α− pseudo MLE) Suppose conditions (A1)-(A5) hold.
Then,
√
n
(
θˆn − θ∗
)
= −H−1θ0,θ∗,α
1√
n
n∑
i=1
αi ˙`θ∗(Xi) + OPθ0 (1) (26a)
= −H−1θ0,θ∗,α
√
nPn,α ˙`θ∗ + OPθ0 (1) (26b)
= −H−1θ0,θ∗,αGn,α ˙`θ∗ + OPθ0 (1). (26c)
Theorem 3 (Asymptotic covariance matrix of the α− pseudo MLE) Suppose conditions (A1)-(A5)
hold. Then,
VarPθ0 −H
−1
θ0,θ∗,α
√
nPn,α ˙`θ∗ (27a)
= H−1θ0,θ∗,α
[
1
n
EPθ0α
2
i
˙`
θ∗(Xi) ˙`θ∗(Xi)
T
]
H−1θ0,θ∗,α (27b)
= H−1θ0,θ∗,αJθ0,θ∗,αH
−1
θ0,θ∗,α (27c)
≤
(
α(n)
αl
)2
H−1θ0,θ∗Jθ0,θ∗H
−1
θ0,θ∗ . (27d)
The scale of the asymptotic sandwich estimator of the α− weighted pseudo MLE is inflated relative
to the ordinary MLE, which will produce overly wide confidence regions. The shape of the confidence
regions of the pseudo MLE may also be different than the ordinary MLE due to the weighting of each
contribution in Hθ0,θ∗,α and Jθ0,θ∗,α, such that the induced misspecification will impact the shape and
scale of the resulting pseudo confidence regions, as well as their centering on θ∗ 6= θ0.
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Theorem 4 (Asymptotic normality of the α− pseudo posterior) Suppose conditions (A1)-(A5) hold.
Then
sup
B∈Θ
∣∣∣∣Πn,α (θ ∈ B | X(n))−Nθˆn,α,H−1θ0,θ∗,α (B)
∣∣∣∣ Pθ0→ 0, (28)
where θˆn,α may be the α− pseudo MLE or the α− pseudo posterior mean.
Proof 1 The proof is directly obtained from Williams and Savitsky (2018) (which adapts Kleijn and
van der Vaart (2012) to the setting of a survey sampling-weighted pseudo posterior estimator) by re-
placing Nν with n, PpiNν with Pn,α and Hθ0 with Hθ0,θ∗,α.
The asymptotic credibility region of the α− pseudo posterior distribution will not contract on the
frequentist confidence region for the pseudo MLE or the ordinary MLE due to the failure of Bartlett’s
second identity under a misspecified likelihood that prevents the collapse of the sandwich form of the
variance estimator in Equation (27c). The implication is that the pseudo posterior credibility regions
may under- or over-cover.
5 Simulation Study
We simulate 1,000 univariate outcome values from a 2-component mixture of lognormal distribution
with 15 categorical predictors in a fashion to induce a highly skewed marginal distribution, as shown
in Figure 4. We run the TDP mixture synthesizer developed in Section 2 on the log of the response
variable, y.
Computation of the TDP mixture synthesizer is done using Stan programming language. We run
the TDP mixture synthesizer on the simulated data for 10,000 iterations with 5,000 burn-in. We set
aγ = bγ = 1 for the Gamma prior for the DP concentration parameter γ. We set the maximum number
of learned clusters, K = 20, as we expect few clusters since the logged data are relatively symmetric,
and generate m = 20 synthetic datasets, Z.
Using the methods in Section 3.1, we compute record-level identification disclosure risks, (IR1, · · · , IRn),
for all n records, based on the percentage radius r = 20%, which is preferred by the CE program, and
the intruder’s knowledge of a known pattern (containing 5 out of the 15 predictors), the true value
of each record and their identities. We then calculate record-level weights, (α1, · · · , αn), using the
methods in Section 3.2. To compute the record-level ci’s, we use the scurve function in the LS2Wstat
R package with the coefficient of slope of the curve, a = 0.8, and set cmin = 1 and cmax = 1.5. The
vectorized weights, (α1, · · · , αn), are then used to exponentiate the likelihood contribution of n records.
The new vector-weighted, pseudo-posterior version of the TDP mixture synthesizer is again estimated
using Stan with the same prior specification, and a new set of m = 20 synthetic datasets, ZV , are
generated. As a comparison, a single scalar weight, α = 0.65 is used for every record. The scalar
value is chosen because it produces nearly the same utility measure for useful distribution statistics as
the vectorized weights, by design. We use the same prior specification, and generate m = 20 synthetic
datasets, denoted by ZS . Two sets of record-level identification disclosure risks, one for ZV and another
for ZS , are computed. We next reveal that, though the scalar weighting is designed to produce nearly
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Figure 4: Density plot of outcome value.
the same utility as the vector weighting for some distribution statistics, it produces higher risks. This
result demonstrates the greater efficiency of vector weighting as compared to scalar weighting.
First, we investigate the utility of synthetic datasets. To do so, we compare the density plots of
the value variable generated by the three different synthesizers to its true density plot in simulated
data. Figure 5 and Figure 6 present density plots in the high mass and tail portions of the data
distribution, respectively. Two ranges of the value variable are plotted to allow closer examination of
the density plots. The red curve is for the actual response values generated in the simulated data,
denoted as “Data”; the green curve is for one synthetic dataset of Z, generated from the synthesizer
before applying weights, denoted as Synthesizer; the blue curve denotes the synthetic dataset of ZV ,
generated from the vector-weighted synthesizer, denoted as Weights V; and the purple curve is for one
synthetic dataset of ZS , generated from the scalar-weighted synthesizer after applying scalar weights,
denoted as Weights S.
In both plots, the Synthesizer distribution is the closest among the three synthesizers to the Data
distribution, indicating good model fitting of our proposed TDP mixture synthesizer in Section 2. This
suggests high utility of the synthetic datasets, Z, before applying weights. The Weights V distribution
shows similar deviation from the Data distribution compared to the Weights S in the high mass portion,
indicating a similar level of synthetic data utility, though Weights S expresses more distortion in the
tail portion of the distribution, shown in Figure 6, through tempering. An interesting takeaway is
that the Weights V distribution shows a higher peak at the mode around 0.1 in the high mass portion
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of the distribution. shown in Figure 5. Values in the downward portion on the side of the mode
express relatively higher identification disclosure risks because they are in portions of the synthetic
data density with relatively few other records. So the vector weighting has the effect of concentrating
the mode as those higher risk records are moved closer to the mode, which reduces their risk. Their
assigned synthesized values are more concentrated around the mode than in Data. We also more clearly
observe in Figure 6 that the Weights V vector-weighted model shrinks high-risk records in the tail back
towards the modes, while generally preserving (and even accentuating) the modes.
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Figure 5: Density plots comparison of the value
variable. Range (0, 0.5).
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Figure 6: Density plots comparison of the value
variable. Range (0.5, 5).
Figures 7 through 9 provide further support and insight for the behaviors of different synthesizers.
These scatter plots display the values for the synthetic data versus the real data. The Synthesizer in
Figure 7 clearly preserves the value variable record-by-record the best, as the dots are closely along
the y = x line. The Weights V in Figure 8 surgically downweights portions of the data distribution.
We can see that most of the largest values at the upper right corner are assigned with low synthesized
values (around the two modes, 0.1 and 1). This phenomenon is expected because the vector weights are
downweighting the likelihood contribution of records with high identification disclosure risks. Figure
8 also shows that other records with modest values can have high identification disclosure risks as
well, and are shrunk by Weights V. Applying scalar weights produces a fanning pattern of the dots in
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Figure 9, indicating a decrease of the preservation of the modes of the density under Weights S. Scalar
weights downweight the likelihood contribution of each record, equally, neglecting the different degrees
of privacy protection encoded by the synthesizer for different records. The corresponding densities
Weight S in Figure 5 and Figure 6, show a flattening phenomenon that results in a decrease of data
utility.
Table 2 and Table 3 show that Weights V achieves similar bootstrapped confidence intervals of key
descriptive statistics that characterizes a distribution, such as the median and the mode, as compared
to the Synthesizer and Weights S, indicating similarly high level of preservation of utility for these
statistics when applying both scalar and vector weights.
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Weights V vs Data.
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Figure 9: Scatter plot of
Weights S vs Data.
Weights point estimate 95% C.I.
Data 0.093 [0.091, 0.095]
Synthesizer 0.093 [0.091, 0.094]
Weights V 0.092 [0.091, 0.093]
Weights S 0.093 [0.091, 0.094]
Table 2: Table of C.I. of median of the value vari-
able.
Weights point estimate 95% C.I.
Data 0.070 [0.068, 0.071]
Synthesizer 0.069 [0.067, 0.071]
Weights V 0.069 [0.067, 0.071]
Weights S 0.069 [0.067, 0.071]
Table 3: Table of C.I. of mode of the value variable.
We now turn to the examination of the risk profiles for the synthetic datasets. Figure 10 presents
the violin plots of the identification disclosure risks of the synthetic datasets generated from the vector-
weighted synthesizer, Weights V, and the scalar-weighted synthesizer, Weights S, and plots them side-
by-side. The figure also includes the risk distribution for the original synthesizer, labeled “Synthesizer”.
The risk distribution plot for the original synthesizer shows a longer upper tail than the other two,
indicating that both Weights V and Weights S successfully lower the maximum identification disclosure
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Figure 10: Violin plots of the identification disclosure risks of Synthesizer, Weights V, and Weights S.
risks of the records. Yet, the risk distribution for Weights V is shifted downward as compared to
Weights S. Figure 10 also reveals a higher concentration of relatively low identification disclosure risks
by Weights V, evident in its fuller lower tail, as compared to Weights S. This is supported by Table 11,
where the identification disclosure risks for the top 10 risky records are greatly decreased in the columns
Weights V and Weights S, from the unweighted synthesizer shown in the column, labeled “Synthesizer”;
in fact, the vector-weighting successfully lowers the risks for 8 of the top 10 risky records to 0, and
the remaining 2 to almost 0. The superior risk reduction performance of Weights V over Weights S
further demonstrates that our vector-weighting is able to surgically distort high risk portions of the
distribution, providing higher disclosure protection for targeted records.
A closer examination of the column, “Data Value”, in Table 11 suggests that not all of the top 10
risky records are records with extremely high values. We, therefore, present Table 12, where the iden-
tification disclosure risks of the top 10 records by size or magnitude are shown, under the Synthesizer,
Weights V, and Weights S. Again, Weights V gives high performance in risk reduction. It is worth not-
ing that the first record, with Data Value 1.710438 in Table 12, starts with a not-so-high identification
disclosure risk of 0.3818 under Synthesizer. It ends up with a not-so-low identification disclosure risk
of 0.1455 under Weights V. This is not surprising because its weight is inversely proportional to its
beginning identification disclosure risk. With a relatively low IR = 0.3818, its calculated weight would
not downweight its likelihood contribution as much as the other large size records in the table.
In summary, our proposed TDP mixture synthesizer preserves high utility; however, its high utility
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results in portions of the synthesized data distribution with high identification disclosure risks. Using a
vector-weighted version of the TDP mixture synthesizer can surgically distort those high risk portions,
therefore producing synthesized data that provides higher disclosure protection. It also maintains a
reasonably high level of utility, successfully balancing the risk-utility trade-off of synthetic data.
Data Value Synthesizer Weights V Weights S
0.5959832 0.9311 0.0486 0.2419
0.4713665 0.8756 0.0000 0.0974
3.3694715 0.9256 0.0000 0.0000
2.4854301 0.8264 0.0000 0.0486
0.6002610 0.9118 0.0000 0.1882
0.5880128 0.8264 0.0486 0.1444
0.5348753 0.8500 0.0000 0.0957
2.9259830 0.9194 0.0000 0.0000
0.6818285 0.8952 0.0000 0.2355
2.4694975 0.9212 0.0000 0.0485
Figure 11: Table of Identification Risks for Top 10
risky records.
Data Value Synthesizer Weights V Weights S
1.710438 0.3818 0.1455 0.0939
3.369471 0.9256 0.0000 0.0000
2.485430 0.8264 0.0000 0.0486
1.665322 0.7155 0.0488 0.3381
2.963501 0.7266 0.0000 0.0000
2.245890 0.6811 0.0000 0.0486
2.091579 0.6290 0.0484 0.0484
2.925983 0.9194 0.0000 0.0000
2.469497 0.9212 0.0000 0.0486
2.005061 0.8130 0.0000 0.0935
Figure 12: Table of Identification Risks for Top 10
size / magnitude records.
6 Application to Synthesis of CE Family Income
We now apply our methods to synthesizing the sensitive family income variable, y, in the CE data
sample introduced in Section 1.1. We run the TDP mixture synthesizer on the log of the family income
variable, and compute the record-level identification disclosure risk for each CU. We then construct
the vector of weights, (α1, · · · , αn), and apply them to formulate the pseudo posterior synthesizer from
which we generate new collections of synthetic datasets. The new vector-weighted version of the TDP
mixture synthesizer is, again, run using Stan with the same prior specification as in the simulation
study, and a new set of m = 20 synthetic datasets, ZV , are generated. We evaluate the utility and
identification disclosure risk profiles of the vector-weighted synthesizer and comparator synthesizers
introduced and discussed in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2. We employ radius, r = 20%, as before, but
also examine sensitivity of the identification risk to different choices of the percentage radius, r, and
compare our proposed methods to CE survey program’s current practice of top-coding.
6.1 Utility
Figures 13 and 14 compare the density plots of the family income variable in the CE data (denoted
as Data), the synthesizer before weighting (denoted as Synthesizer), and the synthesizer after vector-
weighting (denoted as Weights V). Weights V shows a higher peak than Data in Figure 14, which
displays the right-tail of the data due to relative concentration of the mode. As we saw in the simulation
study, a high-peak mode will produce more isolated record values in the downward slope portions of the
distribution, which induces a contraction of points towards the more populated mode after risk-based
weighting.
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Figure 13: Density plots comparison of the family
income variable. Range (-10K, 250K).
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Figure 14: Density plots comparison of the family
income variable. Range (250K, 3,000K).
The scatter plots in Figure 15 and Figure 16 show the synthetic versus true data values for the orig-
inal synthesizer (labeled, “Synthesizer”) and the vector-weighted synthesizer (labeled, “Weights V”),
respectively, and provides more insight. The original synthesizer demonstrates a high degree of fanning,
indicating a relatively large amount of distortion of the by-record values from the true data, while the
above density figures show very good utility (because the density for Synthesizer maps well to the true
data distribution). This phenomenon results from a mixing of records that occurs when generating new
synthetic data from our synthesizer estimated on the real data and encodes a higher level of identifica-
tion disclosure protection; in particular, the binary indicators (T
(l)
p,i ) used in our proposed identification
disclosure risk measure in Equation (8) are more often 0 (the synthetic family income for a record being
outside the pre-defined radius from the true family income).
The increased fanning pattern of Figure 16 for Weights V as compared to that for the original
synthesizer, shown in Figure 16, appears to show generally more distortion. Yet, we note that the
envelope of distortion is reduced (which is seen by looking at the left- and right-hand sides the scatter
plots), which indicates the vector-weighting focuses the distortion for those high-risk records that lie in
the portion of the distribution away from the main features of the data. The concentration of synthetic
values at the mode induced by the weighting actually reduces distortion for some points as compared to
the original synthesizer, while yet the overall data distribution, as shown in Figure 13, is well-preserved.
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These results suggest that the Weights V is inducing a surgical distortion in high risk portions of the
original data distribution.
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Figure 15: Scatter plot of Syn-
thesizer vs Data.
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Figure 16: Scatter plot of
Weights V vs data.
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Figure 17: Scatter plot of top-
coded data vs Data.
Figure 17 represents the effects of top-coding, which is designed to distort the right-tail of the family
income distribution for especially high income values, while leaving untouched other portions of the
data distribution. So, while it is even more surgical in targeting a portion of the real data distribution
for distortion, this method implicitly assumes that the relatively high risk records are solely those that
express large magnitude values for the income variable. We reveal in Section 6.2 that this assumption
is false when comparing the identification disclosure risks under the three methods.
We, furthermore, evaluate the preservation of key descriptive statistics of the family income variable
across the Synthesizer, Weights V, and the top-coding procedure. Table 4 presents the performances
on the mean, showing that Weights V is achieving slightly higher level of preservation, compared to
the Synthesizer and top-coding. Similar results on the median and other quantiles are omitted for
brevity. We also consider the Gini coefficient, the commonly used measure of economic inequality, on
the family income variable. Compared to the Synthesizer and top-coding Table 5 shows equally high
level of preservation of the Gini coefficient by Weights V.
Weights point estimate 95% C.I.
Data 72090.26 [70127.02, 74053.50]
Synthesizer 72386.83 [70309.45, 74464.21]
Weights V 72030.33 [70008.06, 74052.60]
Topcoding 72364.43 [70572.36, 74156.50]
Table 4: Table of C.I. of the mean of the family
income variable.
Weights point estimate 95% C.I.
Data 0.200 [0.055, 0.575]
Synthesizer 0.194 [0.046, 0.555]
Weights V 0.194 [0.046, 0.532]
Topcoding 0.195 [0.054, 0.483]
Table 5: Table of C.I. of the Gini coefficient of the
family income variable.
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Another set of important utility measures focuses on preserving estimates of regression coefficients.
To demonstrate, we run a regression analysis of family income on region, urban status, and earner status
of a CU. Table 6 presents the performances on the second level of the Earner predictor, and results on
other levels are similar and omitted for brevity. Overall, we observe high level of utility preservation
provided by Weights V. We note that the top-coding procedure on the CE data only affects about 6%
of all the data points, leaving the remaining 94% data points untouched. It is therefore not surprising
to obtain high utility with the top-coded data.
Weights point estimate 95% C.I.
Data -45826.20 [-49816.29, -41836.11]
Synthesizer -46017.29 [-50239.20, -41795.37]
Weights V -45868.47 [-49999.82, -41373.13]
Topcoding -47132.81 [-50730.29, -43535.32]
Table 6: Table of C.I. of predictor Earner 2 in the regression analysis.
We now turn to the disclosure risks evaluation, where we show Weights V provides significant
reduction in disclosure risks while maintaining equally high level of utility, compared to top-coding.
6.2 Identification disclosure risks
To compare the risk profiles of the synthetic datasets, we use violin (density) plots shown in Figure
18. In addition to the Synthesizer and Weights V plots on the left, we include the distributions for
the identification disclosure risks of the top-coded family income (that is currently publicly available in
CE PUMD). We use three different values of the percentage radius r in the risks calculation: r = 5%,
denoted as TC 5%; r = 10%, denoted as TC 10%; and r = 20%, denoted as TC 20%. Recall that for
the Synthesizer and Weights V plots, we set r = 20%. Our known pattern is composed of the following
5 categorical variables, {gender, age, education level, marital status, earner}, when calculating the
identification disclosure risks.
Firstly, we observe that Weights V lowers the overall identification disclosure risks as compared to
Synthesizer. This confirms and demonstrates our proposed vector-weighting method provides higher
disclosure protection, reducing the peak record-level identification disclosure risks. The columns Syn-
thesizer and Weights V in Table 7, which shows the identification risk for the top 10 risky records
as measured from the synthetic data produced by the original synthesizer, further supports the risk
reduction performance of Weights V. In Table 7 and Table 8, the range, instead of the actual data
value, is provided in column “Data Value” for confidentiality.
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Figure 18: Violin plots of the identification disclosure risks in Z generated from Synthesizer (the original
synthesizer) and Weights V based on the vectorized weights as compared to top-coding with r = 5%,
r = 10%, and r = 20%, from left-to-right.
Secondly, we note that while the intention of top-coding is to provide disclosure protection, top-
coding only provides such protection on CUs with extreme large family income (as is evident in their
long tails and large bulbs around 0 in Figure 18 and the column TC 20% in Table 8). At the same time,
since the majority of the family income is not top-coded (see Figure 17), top-coding fails to provide any
disclosure protection to most of the CUs that express high identification disclosure risks (as evident in
their upper portions in Figure 18). Their identification disclosure risks are high because their family
income is unchanged, resulting in only a single value near the target income, while yet T
(l)
p,i = 1 (which
is perfect risk situation).
We recommend that statistical agencies re-evaluate their practice of top-coding for disclosure pro-
tection. Based on our findings, we recommend the alternative of synthetic data production for the
CE PUMD. For CUs with unacceptably high identification disclosure risks, we recommend using our
proposed risk-weighted pseudo posterior approach to surgically downweight the likelihood contributions
for high risk records for synthetic data generation.
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Data Value Synthesizer Weights V TC 20%
(-10K, 50K) 0.6258 0.0925 0.9762
(50K, 100K) 0.5318 0.1717 0.8312
(100K, 250K) 0.5725 0.1635 0.8108
(100K, 250K) 0.5274 0.2261 0.8889
(100K, 250K) 0.5369 0.1560 0.7738
(100K, 250K) 0.5258 0.1348 0.8788
(-10K, 50K) 0.5270 0.3250 0.9400
(100K, 250K) 0.5310 0.1708 0.8214
(100K, 250K) 0.5925 0.0460 0.9080
(50K, 100K) 0.5351 0.2629 0.7113
Table 7: Table of Identification Risks for Top 10
risky records.
Data Value Synthesizer Weights V TC 20%
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0000 0.0486 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0482 0.1446 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0000 0.2473 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0000 0.1440 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0496 0.0987 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0967 0.0000 0.9565
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0986 0.0989 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0000 0.0986 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0987 0.0000 0.0000
(250K, 3,000K) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 8: Table of Identification Risks for Top 10
size / magnitude records.
7 Conclusion
We propose a general framework, configured as a vector-weighted, pseudo posterior distribution, that
facilitates achievement of a closer-to-optimal trade-off between identification disclosure risk and utility
for the data analyst in publicly released synthetic datasets performed by statistical agencies. Our risk-
weighted, pseudo posterior formulation surgically downweights the likelihood contributions for those
records in relatively high risk portions of the true data distribution, while leaving the remainder of the
data distribution relatively undistorted. This approach facilitates the utilization of a flexible, mixture
synthesizer that well re-produces the true data distribution because the risk-based weighting may be
used to lower identification disclosure risks. So the statistical agencies are not required to conduct a
search over the space of synthesizing models in the hope to find one that will both meet a desired
identification risk threshold while providing excellent utility.
We demonstrate in a simulation study, and for a real data application to the CE data sample, that
our proposed risk-weighted synthesizer maintains a high level of data utility while providing superior
disclosure protection, successfully balancing the risk-utility trade-off of synthetic data. Moreover, our
proposed risk-weighted pseudo posterior approach is generalizable, applicable to any synthesizer that
expresses high risk portions of the resulting synthetic data distribution. Our approach is supported
with a frequentist consistency guarantee under the condition that the percentage of records that are
downweighted grows more sparse in the limit of the sample size, which well accords with the targeting
of small portions of the real data distribution for distortion that express relatively high identification
disclosure risks. From a theoretical standpoint, our use of vector-weighting achieves the goal of pro-
ducing an estimator that contracts on a θ∗ that is closer to the truth, θ0, than is possible under scalar
weighting because the downweighting is confined to a portion of the data distribution. Our novelty is
to leverage the idea of misspecification in the literature where it is used to address corruption in the
data generating process and redirect it to the purposeful inducing of misspecification in order to encode
privacy protection. Our proposed vector weights synthesizer has superior risk reduction performance
over the scalar weights synthesizer, due to its flexibility of targeting records with high risks individually.
Connecting our work to the differential privacy framework for encoding privacy protection, Dim-
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itrakakis et al. (2017) construct their differential privacy criterion to estimate the sensitivity of the
posterior distribution to the addition of a data record. Using the exponential mechanism of McSh-
erry and Talwar (2007) guarantees privacy by sampling from a noisy version of the posterior, with the
noise proportional to the uniform sensitivity bound over the spaces of the data and parameters. Dimi-
trakakis et al. (2017) show that to achieve a differential privacy bound requires truncation of the prior,
which severely damages the resulting synthetic data utility. We believe that a selective downweighting
of records may reduce the amount of required noise and are exploring this potential in an ongoing
research project.
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8 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us the define the following subset of θ ∈ Θ,
Un =
{
θ ∈ Θ :
[
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)nξ2n
}
,
which is the restricted set for which we will bound the pseudo posterior distribution, Πn,α
(
Un | X(n)
)
,
from above to achieve the result of Theorem 1. We begin with the statement and proof of Lemma 1
that extends Lemma 8.1 of Ghosal et al. (2000) to our α− pseudo posterior in order to provide a
concentration inequality to probabilistically (in Pθ0-probability) bound the denominator of the α−
pseudo posterior distribution, Πn,α
(
Un | X(n)
)
, from below.
8.1 Enabling Lemma
Lemma 1 (Concentration Inequality) Suppose condition (A1) holds. Define αm = maxi∈An αi and
αl = mini∈An αi. For every ξn > 0 and measure Π on the set Bn (θ∗, ξ; θ0), we have for every C∗1 =√
2 + C21 + C
2
3 , and n sufficiently large,
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn (dθ) ≤ e−αm(D+t)nξ2n
 ≤ (1 + α2l )(C∗1 )2α2m × 1(D + t− 1)2nξ2n , (29)
where the above probability is taken with the respect to Pθ0.
Proof 2 The proof follows that of Savitsky and Toth (2016) by bounding the probability expression on
left-hand size of Equation (29). Using Jensen’s inequality,
log
∫
θ∈Bn
n∏
i=1
[
pθ,i
pθ∗,i
(Xi)
]αi
Πn (dθ)
≥
n∑
i=1
∫
θ∈Bn
αi log
pθ,i
pθ∗,i
Πn (dθ)
= nPn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ)
(30)
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We may use the above to now bound the left-hand size of Equation (29)
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn (dθ) ≤ e−αm(D+t)nξ2n
 (31a)
≤ Pθ0
nPn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)nξ2n
 (31b)
= Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)nξ2n −
√
nPθ0 log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ)
 (31c)
≤ Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t)
√
nξ2n −
√
nξ2n
 (31d)
= Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθ
pθ∗
Πn (dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t− 1)
√
nξ2n
 , (31e)
where the bound in Equation (31d) uses the prior mass result from condition (A1). We proceed to use
Chebyshev to bound the resultant probability, as follows:
Pθ0
Gn,α
∫
θ∈Bn
log
pθpθ∗
Π n
(dθ) ≤ −αm(D + t− 1)
√
nξ2n

≤
∫
θ∈Bn
[
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log pθpθ∗
)2]
Πn (dθ)
α2m(D + t− 1)2nξ4n
, (32)
where we have applied Fubini to the right side of Equation (32) to move the expectation through the inte-
gral. We now proceed to further bound the expression in brackets on the right-hand side of Equation (32)
from above. We may decompose the expectation, as follows
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
≤ nEPθ0
(
Pn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
− Pn log pθ
pθ∗
)2
+ EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(33)
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We first bound the second term on the right,
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34a)
≤ EPθ0
(√
nPn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34b)
≤ EPθ0
(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34c)
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
EPθ0
(
log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
(34d)
≤ 1
n
× nξ2n = ξ2n, (34e)
where we use independence of the Xi to establish the fourth equation and condition (A1) to achieve the
fifth equation.
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We proceed to further simplify the bound in the first term on the right in Equation (33):
nEPθ0
(
Pn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
− Pn log pθ
pθ∗
)2
(35a)
= nEPθ0
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
(αi − 1) log pθ,i
pθ∗,i
)2
(35b)
=
1
n
n∑
i,j=1
EPθ0
[
(αi − 1) (αj − 1) log pθ,i
pθ∗,i
(Xi) log
pθ,j
pθ∗,j
(Xj)
]
(35c)
=
1
n
n∑
i=j=1
EPθ0
[
(αi − 1)2 log pθ,i
pθ∗,i
(Xi)
2
]
+
1
n
n∑
i 6=j=1
EPθ0
∣∣∣∣[(αi − 1) (αj − 1) log pθ,ipθ∗,i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
]∣∣∣∣
(35d)
≤ 1
n
(1− αl)2
n∑
i 6=j=1
EPθ0
[
log
pθ,i
pθ∗,i
(Xi)
2
]
+
1
n
(1− αl)2
∑
i 6=j∈An
∣∣∣∣EPθ0 log pθ,ipθ∗,i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
∣∣∣∣
+
1
n
(
1− α(n)
)2 ∑
i 6=j∈Qn
∣∣∣∣EPθ0 log pθ,ipθ∗,i (Xi) log pθ,jpθ∗,j (Xj)
∣∣∣∣
(35e)
≤ 1
n
{
(1− αl)2 nξ2n
}
+
1
n
(1− αl)2
(
C21n− C1
√
n
)
ξ2n + nQ
C23ξ
2
n
nQ
(35f)
=
{
(1− αl)2 ξ2n
}
+ (1− αl)2C21ξ2n + C23ξ2n, (35g)
for sufficiently large n. The bound in Equation (35f) results from the restriction of θ to Bn (θ
∗, ξ; θ0)
and also from condition (A2) that regulates the growth of the number of αi < 1
− and the magnitude of
(1− α(n)).
We may now bound the expectation on the right-hand size of Equation (32),
EPθ0
(
Gn,α log
pθ
pθ∗
)2
≤
{
(1− αl)2 ξ2n
}
(1− αl)2C21ξ2n + ξ2n (36a)
≤ {(1− 2αl + α2l ) ξ2n + (1− 2αl + α2l )C21ξ2n + C23ξn2 + ξ2n} (36b)
≤ (2 + C21 + C23 )ξ2n + (1 + C21 )α2l ξ2n ≤ (1 + αl)2(C∗1 )2ξ2n (36c)
for n sufficiently large, where we set C∗1 :=
√
C21 + C
2
3 + 2. This concludes the proof.
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8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We begin by constructing the α− pseudo posterior distribution on the set, Un,
Πn,α
(
Un
∣∣X(n)) = ∫ Un e−rn,α(θ,θ∗)Πn(dθ)∫
Θ e
−rn,α(θ,θ∗)Πn(dθ)
. (37)
We next bound the numerator from above in Pθ0− probability.
EPθ0
∫
Un
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn(dθ) (38a)
=
∫
Un
A
(n)
θ0,α
(θ, θ∗) Πn(dθ) (38b)
=
∫
Un
e−
∑n
i=1(1−αi)Dθ0,α,iΠn(dθ) (38c)
≤
∫
Un
e
−(1−αm)
∑
i∈An Dθ0,α,i−(1−α(n))
∑
i∈Qn Dθ0,1−,i Πn(dθ) (38d)
≤ e−(D+3t)nξ2n , (38e)
where we use Fubini to switch the order of expectation and integration in Equation (38b). We achieve
the bound in Equation (38d) since Dθ0,α,i > 0, ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n) and Bhattacharya et al. (2019) shows
that D
(n)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗) is finite and contracts on the K-L divergence. The final bound uses the definition of
Un.
We proceed to use the Markov inequality and the definition for Un to achieve the numerator bound
with respect to Pθ0− probability,
Pθ0

∫
Un
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn(dθ) ≥ e−(D+2t)nξ2n
 (39a)
≤ e
−(D+3t)nξ2n
e−(D+2t)nξ2n
= e−tnξ
2
n ≤ (1 + α
2
l )(C
∗
1 )
2
α2m(D − 1 + t)2nξ2n
. (39b)
We, next, turn to bounding the denominator of Equation (37), from below. Since,∫
θ∈Θ
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn(dθ) ≥
∫
θ∈Bn
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn(dθ),
we may use the result of Lemma 1 in,
Pθ0

∫
θ∈Θ
e−rn,α(θ,θ
∗)Πn(dθ) ≥ e−αm(D+t)nξ2n
 > 1− (1 + α2l )(C∗1 )2α2m(D − 1 + t)2nξ2n . (40)
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Finally, combining the results of Equations (37), (39) and (40): With probability at least 1 −[
2/(D + t− 1)2nξ2n × (1 + α2l (C∗1 )2)/α2m
]
,
Πn,α
([
(1− αm)D(nA)θ0,α (θ, θ∗) + (1− α(n))D
(nQ)
θ0,1−
(θ, θ∗)
]
≥ (D + 3t)nξ2n
∣∣X(n)) ≤
e−(D+2t)nξ
2
neαm(D+t)nξ
2
n
≤ e−tnξ2n
9 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof follows the same strategy as in Williams and Savitsky (2018), which extends Theorem 5.23
in van der Vaart (1998) for a survey sampling-weighted pseudo posterior. In our case, we replace the
survey weights with our α = (α1 ∈ (0, 1), . . . , αn ∈ (0, 1)) that we use to induce misspecification in our
synthesizer. We, briefly, sketch out the proof approach and refer to Williams and Savitsky (2018) and
van der Vaart (1998) for more details.
Under random sequence, hn =
√
n (θ − θ∗), centered on the misspecified point of contraction, θ∗,
we extend the van der Vaart (1998) Lemma 19.31 result,
Gn,α
(√
n
(
`θ∗ +
hn√
n
− `θ∗
)
− hTn ˙`θ∗
)
Pθ0→ 0. (41)
The sequence has 0 mean. Conditions (A3) (which allows application of the Dominated Convergence
theorem) and (A5) the variance converges to 0 with respect in Pθ0− probability and the result in
Equation (41) is achieved.
Conditions (A3), (A1), (A2) (where the latter two conditions establish the consistency result at θ∗
in Theorem 1) and Corollary 5.53 of van der Vaart (1998), the sequence hn is bounded in probability.
We may re-write Equation (41) as,
nPn,α log
pθ∗+ hn√
n
pθ∗
− hTnGn,α ˙`θ∗ − nEPθ0 log
pθ∗+ hn√
n
pθ∗
= OPθ0 (1)
From Condition (A4), we have,
EPθ0 log
pθ∗+ hn√
n
pθ∗
− 1
2n
hTnHθ0,θ∗,αhn = OPθ0 (1)
Substituting this expression above yields,
nPn,α log
pθ∗+ hn√
n
pθ∗
=
1
2
hTnHθ0,θ∗,αhn + h
T
nGn,α ˙`θ∗ + OPθ0 (1), (42)
that we recognize as the local asymptotic normality condition of Kleijn and van der Vaart (2012)
(which we will later use to derive the form for the asymptotic covariance matrix of the pseudo-posterior
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distribution). Equation (42) is true for both hˆn =
√
n
(
θˆn,α − θ∗
)
and h˜n,α = −H−1θ0,θ∗,αGn,α ˙`θ∗ by
Condition Main Result. The remainder of the proof exactly follows van der Vaart (1998) where we
separately plug in each of θˆn,α and h˜n,α for hn into Equation (42) to achieve two equivalent equations
(up to OPθ0 (1)). We take the difference between the two equations and complete the square, which
produces the result of the theorem.
10 Proof of Theorem 3
We constructively derive the variance with respect to Pθ0 , starting with:
VarPθ0 −H
−1
θ0,θ∗,αPn,α
˙`
θ∗ = nH
−1
θ0,θ∗,αVarPθ0Pn,α
˙`
θ∗H
−1
θ0,θ∗,α. (43)
We proceed to evaluate the variance term,
VarPθ0Pn,α
˙`
θ∗ =
1
n2
EPθ0
{
n∑
i=1
αi ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
}2
(44a)
=
1
n2
 n∑
i=j=1
EPθ0α
2
i
˙`
θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
T
+
n∑
i 6=j=1
∣∣∣EPθ0αiαj ˙`θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xj)T ∣∣∣
 (44b)
=
1
n2
α2m ∑
i=j∈An
EPθ0
˙`
θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
T

+
1
n2
(α(n))2 ∑
i=j∈Qn
EPθ0
˙`
θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
T

+
1
n2
α2m ∑
i 6=j∈An
∣∣∣EPθ0 ˙`θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xj)T ∣∣∣

+
1
n2
(α(n))2 ∑
i 6=j∈Qn
∣∣∣EPθ0 ˙`θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xj)T ∣∣∣

(44c)
≤ 1
n
[
(α(n))2
n∑
i=1
EPθ0 (Xi)
˙`
θ∗ (Xi) ˙`θ∗ (Xi)
T
]
(44d)
≤ (α(n))2Jθ0,θ∗ , (44e)
where the cross-product terms in Equation (44c) may be bounded from above by replacing the αiαj
with α2m for i, j ∈ An and with (α(n))2 for i, j ∈ Q(n), which, in turn, is bounded above by 0 due to
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Xi ⊥ Xj and condition (A5) to produce the result in Equation (44d). Finally, we note the following
inequality,
H−1θ0,θ∗,α ≤ [αlHθ0,θ∗ ]
−1 , (45)
and the result is achieved.
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